

The Future of Indo-China Military Rivalry

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Introduction

The June-August border crisis between the People's Republic of China and India at the Doklam Plateau stirred the political and security environment of the region. What started off as a Chinese road project in Doklam, a disputed territory between Bhutan and China, soon took the shape of border troops' engagement between Indian and China. India claims that it acted on behalf of Bhutan.¹ A treaty signed between India and Bhutan in 1949, known as the Treaty of Friendship empowered India to control both foreign and defence policies of Bhutan and act on its behalf.² The issue's origin lies in Bhutan laying claim to the Doka La Plateau, however the claim is refuted by China on the basis that historically the territory was a part of Tibet.

The issue has subsided for now, but at the peak of the conflict, both China and India were persistent that the other should withdraw their forces. The crisis was averted as both sides agreed to resolve the issue amicably. While India and China have multiple disputed borders, like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, the focus of this paper will be on the one at the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan. This paper will discuss how an issue such as the standoff at Doklam in addition to other border issues, in tandem with military modernization, naval competition, nuclear signaling, and US involvement in the region may lead to a larger scale conflict, or war, between the two nuclear powers.

There are several explanations for why states go to war. Fearon's "Rationalist Explanations for War" (1995) proposes that in some circumstances, war appears to be a logical and profitable option for leaders. One of the reasons why leaders might circumvent diplomacy and peaceful means of settlement of political issues can

arise from “commitment issues,” which may arise from a lack of faith in the other side to keep their end of the bargain. Expanding upon the neo-realist explanation of state behavior, the theory surmises that as military capabilities and doctrines increase in their magnitude, the chances for winning of war by a state also increase, thus making war preferable over a period of time as capabilities augment. As chances of winning increase, states’ preferences for making a commitment not to exploit their perceived advantages under the state of anarchy decrease. Additionally, as the existing gap between the relative power capabilities of two states increase, however, the weaker state would also be more inclined to attack the stronger state first with the belief that it would be able to negotiate a bargain that would be acceptable to it if it initiated war.³

Johnson and Tierney’s “Rubicon Theory of War” (2011), which draws from psychological explanations of war, postulates that people switch from a “deliberative” to “implemental” mind-set after crossing a certain “psychological Rubicon”, which can lead to “more aggressive or risky military planning”.⁴ The premise of this logic is based on the assumption that leaders are not rational at all times, and as conflict draws near, start going from a “deliberative” to an “implemental” mindset. The wide ranges of psychological factors that may cause war include glory, revenge, fear, hatred and biases barring sound judgment and decision-making, can collectively lead to an implemental mind-set and cause overconfidence (both on the leadership as well as societal level) in the time that is perceived to be leading up to war. One of the ways by which conflict can start is by loss of control of a situation, in which leaders feel they inevitably slide into war inadvertently. In such a case, overconfidence is not affected by capabilities, and spikes even if capabilities remain constant, making them more acceptable of the prospect of war and more prone to risk-taking and precarious war-plans.

Several scholars agree that territorial issues are the major driving factor that causes war. In the instance of India and China, who have multiple conflicts on the border, with an increase in military buildups and the danger of a border conflict, such as the recent standoff near the Silluguri Corridor, may spiral out of control and spark a conflict. The lack of explicit mutually agreed on commitments to not initiate war, a marked discrepancy in power capabilities on top of increasing military capabilities and assertive doctrines may be a recipe for war. Conversely, if a border conflict spirals into a larger scale-conflict, one or both nuclear armed states may slide into “implemental mindsets”, triggered not by a consideration of capabilities but by overconfidence, that is the major driver of war according to Tierney and Johnson.

This paper will proceed in the following way: the next section will give an account of the historical context of the recent standoff between the two countries. The following section will discuss the strategic significance of the region where it occurred. The next section will give an account of the military competition between the two states, including their nuclear dimension and their development at sea. Finally, US involvement in the succeeding section will be discussed as an instigator of the rivalry between the two states. As the US does not play the role of a middleman in the Sino-India rivalry, its role and involvement in the region is more likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the chances of war.

Historical Context

The end of British reign over the sub-continent and the creation of new states saw the emergence of new borders. However, the non-resolution of many treaties became a bone of contention between India and China post-independence. The Indian and Chinese military remained engaged at Doklam Region, that is connected by Sikkim within Indian territory, Chumbi Valley in Tibet (China) and

Ha Valley in Bhutan. A treaty between India and Bhutan, signed in 1949, outlines some of the rules of engagement between Bhutan and external powers. The article II of the treaty states that, "The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations."⁵ This clause denotes the importance of India in Bhutan's external affairs. In a letter by Nehru to Zhou Enlai,⁶ he enforces India's legitimacy over Bhutan's external affairs. Moreover, he noted that collective security of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the Indian territory was India's responsibility, and no aggression by outside powers would go unaccounted for. In his visit to Bhutan in 1958, Nehru emphasized on India and Bhutan's security stressed on "mutual goodwill" and "help" between the two states.⁷ This reflected the initial shaping of Bhutan and India's relationship and reflects on the subsequent Sino-Bhutan border talks. Therefore, any agreements taking place between Bhutan and China without India's consent would not be acceptable to either India or Bhutan.

In 2007, India rushed the deployment of forces to the region following the destruction by China of a number of Indian bunkers in the Batang La area. China also laid claim to the 2.1-sq km "Finger Area" in north Sikkim that protrudes into the Sora Funnel and dismantled some cairns marking the border in the region. This story would be repeated in 2012.⁸ However, on 16th of June, 2017, India sent its troops to halt the construction activities by the Chinese.

Significance for India and China

The Doklam region is important for security of India, China and Bhutan. For India, control over the Doklam Plateau is essential to

maintaining control over a narrow strip of 17 miles, known as Siliguri Corridor, a 17-mile-wide strip of land, that connects to its remote northeastern States i.e. Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and the disputed Arunachal Pradesh region.⁹ India feels that the road being built by China would give Chinese mainland access to the tri-junction and subsequently, giving it an entryway to the corridor, also called India's "chicken neck". China's presence in proximity to the corridor therefore renders the region vulnerable. The actual border issue, however, is between China and Bhutan, where the latter claims that the tri-boundary point lies at Batang-la, some four kilometers north of the Doka La pass where the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops occurred in 2017. China lays claim to the tri-boundary point at Mount Gipmochi or Gyemochen, a point some two-and-a-half kilometers south of the Doka La pass. Mount Gipmochi marks the terminus at the Indian border: The Jampheri ridge, which marks start of the descent into the foothills of southwestern Bhutan, then leads into the strategically vital Siliguri Corridor.¹⁰

Doklam is of significance for Beijing owing to its claim over Tibet. "Beijing has been on a nationwide infrastructure building-spree since the 1990s, and sensitive border areas have not been left out of this program."¹¹ New Delhi's security concern stems from its consideration of the Chinese access to its 'chicken's neck', which it considers to be of extreme strategic value. For years, maintaining the status quo in disputed areas between India and China has principally been followed by both sides, and this Chinese project was described by the Indian government as a "significant change of the status quo with serious security implications for India."¹²

India's handling of the border issue between Bhutan and China has immense ramifications. The two nuclear armed states had placed their other territorial disputes on the back burner to focus on

economic progress and development in their respective countries. In 2016 alone, trade partnership between India and China amounted to \$71 Billion.¹³ Trade relations between the two states show their growing dependency on each other. Despite territorial conflicts between the two states, they were not allowed to escalate beyond brief border clashes. Nonetheless, the conflict at Doklam has sparked a new debate regarding the consequences of Indo-China border conflicts.

China consented to draw its forces from the conflict, most likely because of its interest in the upcoming BRICs meeting at the time and the matter subsided through the use of diplomatic channels. China is economically oriented and usually maintains a non-contentious stance on most regional issues. But the potential of such a conflict may be viewed in the perspective of the rivalry between the two states. India's objection to China's multi-billion-dollar injection into Pakistan in the form of Pak-China Economic Corridor (CPEC) started materializing this year. It figures in as a part of China's overall strategy to realize its One Belt One Road project (OBOR) or Belt and Road (B&R) Initiative. India's rejection of China's B&R initiative shows the antagonistic lens with which it views China's growing influence in its neighborhood. Furthermore, propping up of India by the US as a counterweight to China's growing military and economic status and the bid to contain Chinese power may put India and China on a collision path.

Implications for Military Competition: Arms Build-up and Military Modernization

The building and repairing of road networks close to the border by India and China signalled that both states have been preparing for better mobility in the area. The frequency of military drills in the proximity of the disputed areas has also increased. China held five military exercises near the disputed area in 2017 and plans to conduct more in the future.¹⁴

The increasing defence budgets of India and China is indicative of their threat perception, although Pakistan and US also are factored in respectively in their security calculus by these states. China's budget according to different reports is estimated at \$215 Billion, which forms 48 percent of the regional defence spending.¹⁵ On the other hand, India's budget recently surged over to \$50 Billion.¹⁶ Despite the difference in defence spending between the two states, India feels confident that not only can it defend itself in a military conflict with China but its capabilities are at par with China's. In a recent statement, India's Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, in response to People's Liberation Army (PLA) spokesperson's remarks that India should learn lessons from its defeat in 1962 and stop clamoring for a war,¹⁷ told China that reminding India about 1962 was pointless because India's military conditions were not as it was in 1962 and China should be wary of the implications of overlooking Indian military's developments since then.

Similarly, China is currently developing its military power to be placed at par with the West. China has worked hard on advancing its military capabilities and reduced reliance on other states for military equipment. The development of Type 039A/B/041 (Yuan-class) diesel-electric attack submarine, SC-19 anti-satellite (ASAT) system, Dongfeng-21D (DF-21D/CSS-5) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and Jian-20 (J-20) stealth fighter aircraft are examples of China's indigenous capability and development.¹⁸ Its weapons program is far more advanced than India's and investment of resource towards its military also exceeded four times that of India.

On the other hand, India's growing nexus with the US and Israel, continuing partnership with Russia and transfer of technology programs is helping it improve its military capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Currently, India has an active military consisting 1,362,500 personnel as compared to China's 2,260,000 personnel.¹⁹ Though

the difference in numbers in active personnel is significant, the reserve pools bring their total military personnel to a close match. The numbers matter as it shows not only the power potential but the financial backing that both the countries provide to their defence.

Equipment	China	India
Total Aircraft	2,955	2,102
Fighters/Interceptors	1,271	676
Attack Aircraft	1,385	809
Transports	782	857
Trainers	352	323
Helicopters	912	666
Attack Helicopters	206	16

Figure 1. Source Global Firepower²⁰

Similarly, their spending and training in the air defence arena can be evaluated by looking at the number of their aircraft and air defence systems. It is evident that the difference in air capability of both states is not significant except that China enjoys a superiority in terms of attack helicopters and Fighter Jets vis-à-vis India. However, it is important to appreciate that the numbers only show the quantitative data which discounts the qualitative side of the available vehicles as well as the experience and training of the pilots, ground control, and integrated systems which play a critical role in defensive and offensive operations.

Equipment	China	India
Tank Strength	6,457	4,426
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	4,788	6,704
Self-Propelled Artillery	1,710	290
Towed Artillery	6,246	7,414
Rocket Projectors	1,770	292

Figure 2. Source: Global Firepower²¹

In terms of Ground Forces, China enjoys a huge advantage over India in some areas such as Rocket Projectors and Self-Propelled Artillery which gives it a considerable leverage. However, the overall capability of both states appear at par with each other. Naturally, the qualitative side of the weapons systems, tanks and launch systems cannot be ascertained on the basis of numbers, therefore the slight difference in the number of some articles may not pose a very serious threat. Once again the military experience and training would play a vital role in the use of any of the weapons.

India's weapons' procurement from Russia, Israel and the US plays a critical role in its prevailing security vis-à-vis China. With the aim to acquire modern weapons systems that surpass the current capability or expertise of China, India seems to be on a trajectory to substantially strengthen its military capability. As per the latest report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India accounted for 13% of the total global arms import between 2012–16 which is highest among all the countries.²² Thus, being the biggest importer of weapons in the last five years.

In April 2017, India and Israel inked a weapons deal worth \$2 Billion. Israel's Aerospace Industry would provide India Medium Range Surface to Air Missile Systems (MRSAM) used to target aerial threats. The deal would also include Long Range air and missile defence systems (LRSAM) to be placed on India's aircraft carrier. MRSAMs' acquisition would enhance India's air-defence systems.

India's partnership with Russia, in the realm of weapons and military equipment makes up nearly 60 percent of the total equipment in the inventory of the Indian defence forces.²³ Their arms trade in 2017 amounted to \$10 Billion which is a huge increase from \$6 Billion in 2016. The 2017 deal includes S-400 air defence systems, the acquisition of four Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and the purchase of 200 Kamov 226T light utility helicopters, or LUH.²⁴ In addition, there are talks of leasing a second nuclear-powered submarine. On the agenda are also the fifth generation fighter aircrafts which is negotiated to be a joint-production venture.

Moreover, the Indo-US partnership in the defence arena has seen a surge in the recent years. In 2016 the United States designated India a "Major defence Partner" with the aim of increasing military cooperation and reducing bureaucratic hurdles in defence deals.²⁵ In 2009, India imported \$237 million worth of military equipment from the US but this jumped to \$1.9 billion in 2014.²⁶ In the past decade, India has bought US weapons systems worth an estimated \$15 billion.²⁷ In 2017, the US Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis' visit to India brought forward a possible deal consisting only Lockheed Martin's F-16 Block 70 aircraft worth \$15 Billion. In addition, talks are in place to set up an industry in India with the help of Lockheed and Saab to produce jets locally. There have also been discussions of a deal involving the sale of 22 unarmed drones, worth more than \$2 billion.²⁸ Similarly, India signed a deal with

France's Dassault worth €7.87 billion or \$9.3 Billion in 2016 to buy 36 Rafales.²⁹

Similarly, in the strategic rivalry between the two, both states have resulted in many recent developments and the debate regarding a possible change in nuclear posture and policy of India is also at the center stage currently. Thus, nuclear postures and doctrines being a product of nuclear capabilities and the conditions under which states may use them, China and India both have assured retaliation postures.

China's nuclear doctrine is kept ambiguous. The broad contours of the Chinese nuclear doctrine have been made public, i.e. credible minimum deterrence, survivable nuclear forces for a second strike capability and "active defence".

India has maintained its claim that its nuclear capability was aimed foremost against its neighbor China. India's nuclear capability also stems from its desire for equality with China, borne out of a need for prestige, and domestic politics. Recently, analysts have opined that India is undergoing a shift in its nuclear doctrine where instead of having one all-encompassing doctrine, it is starting to delineate between the two countries. A Bulletin of Atomic Scientists report states that "While India has traditionally been focused on deterring Pakistan, its nuclear modernization indicates that it is putting increased emphasis on its future strategic relationship with China."³⁰ India's nuclear strategy vis-à-vis China is still not credible, owing to the vast area that the latter occupies, but it is moving towards an ambitious posture that may have implications for China's nuclear posturing in turn.

To begin with, India's nuclear posture is not recessed.³¹ New Delhi has increased the baseline readiness some of its nuclear forces, including nuclear weapons that transported and stored in "encapsulated" or "cannisterized" systems, in which the warhead is likely pre-mated to the delivery vehicle and kept sealed.³²

Despite India's claims that China is the center of its nuclear posture, it does not have a credible nuclear triad for targeting China. Its capabilities are, however, undergoing expansion and modernization. India has two kinds of nuclear capable aircraft, four ballistic missiles that are operational and two that are currently under development. Current nuclear capabilities of India show that it is capable of striking Pakistan and China from its South-Eastern states. Currently it is also developing long range missiles Agni 4 (3,500 km) and Agni 5 (5,200 km). Having an Agni 4 would enable India to target any place in China from its South Eastern states, but having the Agni 5 would allow it to target the latter from central and southern India as well. In addition, India has one ship launched ballistic missile, Dhanush, with a range of 400 km, but this would require India to sail very close to Chinese mainland to meet a target in Chinese territory. India is also developing submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), K-15 (700 km) and K-4 (3000 km) for its submarines, Arihant, and Aridhaman, which is still under construction. But given their short ranges, using these SLBMs to target China would be difficult for India owing to its lack of access through sea to China, except for many thousands of kilometers towards the East, in the South China Sea. Given that India's sea-based deterrent is not yet credible, it is possible that it will aim towards building longer range SLBMs. (India also claims that development of Agni 6 is underway, but no data yet exists on the missile as yet, as the project remains classified.) In November 2017, India also tested a 1000 km range land attack cruise missile,³³ too low in range to target China.

China, whose doctrine is also that of minimum credible with no-first use, has a US-centric nuclear doctrine. However, currently, it has four kinds of ballistic missiles that can reach India; its land-based ballistic missiles; DF-4 (5,500+ km), DF-21 (2,150 km), DF-31 (7,000 km) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) JL-2, which is an SLBM of 7,000 km range. 43 of China's total 143

of ballistic missiles are capable of targeting India, while one operational SLBM, JL-2 (7,000 km) believed to be deployed in Hainan Island in the South of China, with the capacity to reach and target India.

However, China has a conventional capability that has a massive edge over India's in terms of numbers and technology. In any case, the nuclear capability of China is not comparable with India's, in that the discrepancies in their relative capabilities are too huge. Although currently, explicit doctrines do not exist for either China or India for each other, there is a possibility that strategies will evolve in tandem with their developing nuclear capabilities. India has geographical limitations that it cannot overcome so easily, but the trajectory of its posturing and development of nuclear weapon technologies and delivery systems shows that it is keen on getting involved in a competition with a more powerful neighbor.

Additionally, competition in the naval sphere includes conducting military exercises singularly or in cooperation with allies, building up naval assets, ports and other infrastructure to facilitate connectivity, and political statements. The naval spheres of influence of India and China are the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. In addition, China's naval competition with India is also evident in the emergence of power alignments in the region, i.e. China on the one hand, and the US and its allies that includes China's neighboring states, evident in various strategic agreements of India with the US, Japan and Australia. China is vying for a more concerted control of South China Sea and East China Sea wherein its right over the area is contested by other states in the region. Lately, India has also added its voice against Chinese claims. India's partnerships with China's maritime rivals perpetuate the contentiousness building up in this region.

China's growing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas stems from its territorial claims and is spurred by the presence of US navy in the region. China has been modernizing its assault

capabilities to respond to both military incursions into disputed island territories such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands, as well as a support platform for Chinese island bases in these areas. Meanwhile, the Modi government in India introduced explicit mentions of South China Sea in its joint declarations, first with the US in 2014, in line with a more assertive Act East policy³⁴ on China's maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors, and collaboration with several ASEAN nations for India to increase its profile in the region.³⁵

India has a huge advantage in the Indian Ocean Region. Illustrated by its 2015 maritime security strategy "Ensuring Secure Seas," key actions which Indian Navy would be taking for its maritime security includes: the increased presence and rapid response to threats, maritime engagement, capacity building and capability enhancement, maritime security operations, Presence and Surveillance Mission (PSM), and Patrolling and Overseas Deployment (OSD). It also has several information sharing-related agreements, such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US, and White Shipping agreement with France to enable information sharing on maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean.³⁶ The two states are countering each other by allying on opposite sides of the blocs. While India is countering China in the South China Sea, China is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean which India claims to be a region of its influence. With their border issues and the ensuing tensions, an increased presence in the naval domain comes resultantly to exercise more pressure on each other. Tactics such as sending submarines to neighboring ports and docks, using aircraft carriers and using different attack ships also indicate how both states are challenging each other's might.

Equipment	<i>China</i>	<i>India</i>
Aircraft Carriers	1	3
Submarines	68	15
Frigates	51	11
Corvettes	35	23
Patrol Craft	220	139
Mine Warrior Crafts	31	6
Merchant Marine Strength	2,030	340
Major Ports and Terminals	15	7

*Figure 3.*Source: Global Firepower

A scrutiny of India and China's naval fleet shows that India's navy lags far behind China. China enjoys superiority in this domain in terms of its submarines, frigates, destroyers, corvettes, patrol and mine warfare crafts. Whereas the merchant marine strength does not count as actual naval fleet, during war time, merchant marine becomes an auxiliary if not an integral part of defensive, offensive, transportation and rescue operations. With regards to the number of aircraft carriers, India has recently retired two of its aircraft carriers, which renders the number of its aircraft carriers to just one. The plan to induct another carrier, INS Vikrant is in process and it is expected to enter service in 2018.³⁷ As discussed earlier in the paper, India is procuring defence systems and warships to augment its defensive and offensive capabilities, which will help it attain parity with China.

Former Indian Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon in 2014 proclaimed a new 'security grouping' between India and littoral

states of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius, most likely in response to what it calls the “String of Pearls” strategy of China.³⁸ China has developed a network of military and commercial naval facilities along its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in IOR, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Ports in Sudan in the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Through various avenues, China and India have been involved in a bid to gain an upper hand by increasing their respective power capabilities.

US Involvement in the Region

Between India and China, the security issues can be handled on a bilateral platform. However, the presence and involvement of the US in South Asian and Indo-China conventional and strategic balance is off-set in India’s favor and it also determines the future of their defence trajectories. US increasing involvement in the region is borne out of US desire to check China’s rise in the region and globally. By propping India against China, the US aims to counter the Chinese ambitions in IOR, SCS, and South and East Asia. US political and strategic support to India has helped the latter in its advancement, in economic and strategic terms, in recent years. As discussed in the previous section, the creation of logistical support agreements such as LEMOA can be construed as steps to forge a better and quicker response system to deter China.

A small example of how US’ involvement in South Asian affairs is evident in the US claim that echoed India’s position on CPEC as a project that is being built on disputed territory. On October 4, 2017, US Defence Secretary James Mattis told a Congressional hearing that “The One Belt, One Road also goes through disputed territory, and I think that in itself shows the vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate.”³⁹ The statement has given a voice to US’ concerns about China’s increased role in South Asia and the India-centric lens with which it views China’s growth vis-à-vis its neighbours.

The growing Indo-US relationship, which has already been showing the skewed lens with which the US views India's position in the region, creates further regional tensions. As this relationship strengthens, India would function as a US' Viceroy aiming to control its neighbouring countries. Therefore, the balance in both South and East Asia would automatically be upset.

Conclusion

The Indo-China border issues, although subdued currently, can transform into conflicts that might escalate into an actual war between the two countries. The growing tensions, after years of calm at the border between the two states have opened a Pandora's box. Though the issue has been settled for the present,⁴⁰ the conflict at the border is bound to be revisited as China consolidates its claim over this territory. Their current capabilities and the acquisition of newer weapons and military equipment will help them pose an even bigger threat to each other in the future. With the modernization in their weapons systems through indigenous as well as defence cooperation with other states, they are building their war fighting potential. Similarly, their current military trajectories show that they are ready to develop or acquire any weapons or military equipment to not only deter but also to intimidate each other into doing their bidding.

Moreover, being regional giants, any actions taken by China and India in relation to their security issues, trigger insecurity in the smaller states in the neighborhood. In the Doklam standoff between India and China, where the actual issue is between China and Bhutan, India acts as a security guarantor of Bhutan. Simultaneously, India also posits the threat it would face from China's presence near the narrow strip of land that connects the mainland India to its north-eastern states. Bhutan would fear a border standoff between its larger neighbors as any confrontation would alter the dynamics for its security.

As long as borders remain disputed between India and China, the prospect for a larger scale conflict cannot be ruled out. India's Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat notes that, "The recent stand-off in the Doklam plateau by the Chinese side attempting to change the status quo are issues which we need to be wary about, and I think such kind of incidents are likely to increase in the future."⁴¹

Given the centrality of border issues in states' security considerations and a prolonged existence of the stalemate on these issues, nuclear doctrines will certainly evolve into more hardline positions and, as a result, war may inadvertently break out. With the increase in the intensity of the military modernization and posturing between China and India, it is likely that the two countries could reach a point of no return, and be pulled, either by miscalculation or by design, into a military misadventure.

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End Notes

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